William Choong
The Straits Times
Last week, China said it had deployed its first aircraft carrier for an inaugural sea trial. Speaking at a Chinese Defence Ministry briefing last month, Colonel Geng Yansheng stressed that the carrier would be used for “research, experiment and training” and would not affect China’s defensive naval strategy.
Across the region, however, the deployment has triggered concern. Japan, for example, has asked Beijing to explain the rationale behind the carrier, given that the warship is “highly manoeuvrable and offensive”.
As Chinese officials have stressed repeatedly, China has every right to acquire a carrier. Col Geng said that China’s long coastline and vast expanse of territorial waters necessitated such a warship.
For many Chinese, the carrier also represents a prestige acquisition. In 1987, General Liu Huaqing, considered by many to be the father of China’s modern navy, said: “Without an aircraft carrier, I will die with my eyelids open; the Chinese Navy needs to build an aircraft carrier.”
In addition, both foreign and Chinese analysts agree that the carrier – which was acquired from Ukraine in 1998 for US$20 million – will not have any military or operational significance for some time to come.
A full-fledged carrier battle group requires a carrier and an escort force of attack submarines, cruisers and destroyers. Landing fast-moving fighter aircraft on a carrier flight deck is a complicated task that requires years of training.
“China’s “starter carrier” is of very limited military utility, and will primarily serve to confer prestige on a rising great power, to help the military master basic procedures, and to project a bit of power,” wrote Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson at China Sign Post, a website that scours first-hand Chinese sources.
That said, concerns about the Shi Lang, as the carrier has been reportedly named after a Qing-era commander who conquered Taiwan, centre on the context of China’s carrier development and its current behaviour.
First, the acquisition has been a tad disingenuous. When it was purchased in 1998, Beijing said that the carrier would be a “floating casino”. Last week, China’s Defence Ministry punted further, stating officially for the first time that it would go on a sea trial – a prelude to an operational deployment.
Second, the acquisition cannot be divorced from regional perceptions about China’s recent assertive behaviour over the South China Sea. Already, countries such as Japan, Australia and Vietnam have inched closer to the United States and acquired submarines that could be used to target aircraft carriers. Writing last week, PLA Daily correspondent Guo Jianyue added to the well of suspicion by saying that the carrier could be used to settle territorial disputes.
Third, China has argued that carriers could be used for “soft power” missions such as humanitarian assistance. One cannot disagree with this; the US Navy has used its carriers for humanitarian assistance missions in Indonesia and more recently in Japan. But one cannot run away from the fact that carriers – particularly those with fixed-wing aircraft – are inherently offensive platforms.
Fourth, China’s contention that the carrier is part of its defensive strategy should be taken with a pinch of salt.
China has often argued that even offensive moves are consistent with its defensive doctrine. In a paper on China’s strategic culture, analyst Andrew Scobell argues that China’s military strategy is essentially one of “active defence”: While emphasising a defensive strategy, the strategy effectively blurs the distinction between offence and defence.
Thus, China’s attack on Vietnam in 1979, and its wars against India and the former Soviet Union in 1962 and 1969 respectively were all labelled ‘self-defence counter-attacks’ or ziwei fanji.
Lastly, Mr Guo’s contention that the carrier could be used to settle territorial disputes represents official thinking, given that the PLA Daily is a state-run paper. Mr Guo argues that the “deterrent of the carrier is usually larger than its practical effectiveness” and that the “political significance of building aircraft carriers is greater than its military significance”.
Again, such an argument derives from China’s interpretation of traditional Western concepts of deterrence and compellence, which entail the use of coercion to get other countries to bend to one’s will. As Mr Guo argues, the carrier could be used in disputes over the South China Sea. But like nuclear weapons, its potency does not derive from its actual use, but the threat of use.
“(The carrier) will start affecting things like South China Sea negotiations, not because of an overt change in military balance, but it will be looming, brooding in the background,” Mr Dean Cheng, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, told The Washington Post.
China’s carrier does not really change Asia’s balance of power for now, says Professor Huang Jing at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. But the deployment is the “beginning of a change in the power balance in the Asia-Pacific” that all regional players will have to reckon with in their decision-making, he adds.
In short, there is little reason to fear China’s carrier development for now. In the long run, however, what China uses the carrier for will be a source of concern.
thủy tinh vỡ 
Discussion
Comments are closed.